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Dear Mr* Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, plaintiffs/appellants hereby submit the attached opinion
by the Utah Court of Appeals as additional support of their
argument regarding the standard for imposition of punitive
damages, which argument is set forth at pages 11 through 16 of
their Opening Brief and pages 1 through 7 of their Reply Brief in
this matter.

Sincerely,

Ju (Wristfd
JulAa C. Attwood
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cc:
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Royce Biswell,

)

Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
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Appellant Royce Biswell ("Biswell") appeals from the
district court's judgment granting respondent Diane Duncan's
("Duncan's") motion for partial summary judgment dismissing
Biswell*s punitive damage claim against Duncan, an intoxicated
driver, and the court's refusal to give Biswell''s proposed jury .
instruction regarding the extent of Duncan's liability for
aggravating Biswell's pre-existing back injury. We reverse and
remand.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Biswell sustained injuries when her car was hit by Duncan, a
drunken driver, at the intersection of 5065 West and North Temple
in Salt Lake City. Subsequent to the accident, Duncan was
arrested and convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol,
having a blood alcohol content of .10 percent in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1987).
Prior to the accident, Biswell suffered from degenerative
changes in her spine and upper back. Biswell testified that this
condition and other ailments had been "taken care of" prior to the
accident and that she suffered no symptoms. Biswell claims that
it was only after the accident that she experienced the pain and
discomfort she currently experiences in her lower back. Biswell
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contends that the accident aggravated or "lit up- this latent
condition causing permanent partial disability.
Biswell brought a civil action against Duncan seeking
compensatory and punitive damages. Duncan filed a motion for
partial summary judgment claiming that punitive damages were not
recoverable in the context of drunk driving as a matter of law.
Although Duncan's motion was captioned one for -partial summary
judgment/w both parties and the trial judge, in his memorandum
decision, treated it as a motion for partial judgment on the
pleadings. No factual development of Duncan's prior driving
record, her behavior and attitude while drinking, or her conduct
at the scene of the accident was presented to the court.1 The
parties focused exclusively on whether the standard for an award
of punitive damages in Utah requires a finding of -actual malice"
(intent to injure) or -legal malice- (reckless disregard of the
rights of others).
The district court removed the issue of punitive damages
from jury consideration ruling that punitive damages in Utah can
be awarded only if -actual malice- or -malice in fact- is
established. The issue of compensatory damages was tried to the
jury. The trial court refused to give Biswell's proposed jury
instruction on aggravation of a pre-existing condition. The jury
awarded special'damages of $436.63 and general damages of
$500.00. This appeal ensued.
Three issues are presented on appeal. First, was the trial
judge correct in ruling that punitive damages are not recoverable
against this drunken driver because "actual malice- or -factual
malice- was not pled? Second, does the imposition of punitive
damages in a civil suit against a drunken driver contravene Utah's
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy? Third, did
the trial court correctly instruct the jury as to the extent of a
tortfeasor's liability for "lighting up" a pre-existing latent
condition?
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Biswell argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her
claim for punitive damages, as a matter of law, ruling that
1. The only fact presented to the trial court was that Duncan
was arrested and convicted for driving under the influence of
alcohol. This was uncontested in the pleadings. The record on
appeal indicates that Duncan had her license revoked for a
prior DUI conviction. This fact, however, was not argued by
counsel nor considered by the court on Duncan's partial summary
judgment motion.
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she had not pled/ and conceded she could not prove, -actual
malice- or intent to injure. The issue of whether punitive
damages can be imposed against drunken drivers in a civil
action is one of first impression in Utah.
A.
To resolve the issue of whether punitive damages are
recoverable in this State against intoxicated drivers, an
examination of the relevant law in other jurisdictions is
instructive. To date, twenty-two out of twenty-seven
jurisdictions to consider the -question have held that punitive
damages may be assessed against the drunken driver in a civil
proceeding: Alabama (Fritz v. Salva, 406 So.2d 884 (Ala.
1981)); Arizona (Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900,
904 (1976)) (citing Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639
(1929)); Arkansas (Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d
293, 3 A.L.R.2d 203 (1948)); California (Tavlor v. Super. Ct.
of Los Angeles County, 24 Cal.3d 890, 598 P.2d 853, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 693 (1979)); Connecticut, (Infeld v. Sullivan, 151 Conn.
506, 199 A.2d 693 (1964)); Delaware (Walczak v. Healv, 280 A.2d
728 (Del. 1971)); Florida (Ingram v. Petit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla.
1976)); Georgia (Chitwood v. Stoner, 60 Ga. App. 599, 4 S.E.2d
605 (1939)); Illinois (Madison v. Wjgal, 18 111. App. 564, 153
N.E.2d 90 (1958)); Iowa (Nichols v. Hocke, 297 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa
1980)) (citing Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841
(1954)); Kentucky (Wiggington's Adm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650,
217 S.W. 933 (1920)); Minnesota (Hawkinson v. Gever, 352 N.W.2d
784 (Minn. 1984)); Mississippi (Southland Broadcasting Co. v.
Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50 So.2d 572 (1951)); Missouri (Smith v.
Savles, 637 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. App. 1982)) (remanded punitive
damages issue to provide plaintiff an opportunity to develop
and present evidence on intoxication); Montana (Allers v.
Willis, 197 Mont. 499, 643 P.2d 592 (1982)); New Mexico
(Sveicara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (N.M. App.
1971));.New York (Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc.2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d
306 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973)); North Carolina (Huff v. Chrismon, 68
N.C. App. 525, 315 S.E.2d 711 (1984)); Oregon (Harrell v. Ames,
265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973)); Pennsylvania (Focht v.
Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970)); but see Harvey
v, Hassinger, 315 Pa. Super. 108, 461 A.2d 814, 816 (1983)
(noting that Focht was decided prior to the effective date of
the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, which
became effective July 19, 1975); Tennessee (Pratt v. Duck, 28
Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945)); Texas (Crider v.
Appelt, 696 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985)).
The jurisdictions that have held that punitive damages
are not recoverable against the drunken driver are generally
governed by a standard of punitive damages requiring "actual
malice" or "malice in fact." See Comment, Punitive Damages and
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the Drunken Driver, 8 Pepperdine L. Rev , 11 ), 1 38 (1980). 2
These courts generally require "that state of mind under which
a person's conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will, a
spirit of revenge, retaliation, or a deterraination to vent 1: 11 IL:.
feelings upon other persons'* before awarding punitive damages.
Detling v. Chocklev, 70 Ohio St, 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d 208, 210
(1982) (quoting Columbus Finance v. Howard, 4 2 Ohio St.2d 1 78,
2 84, 3 27 N.E.2d 6 54, 658 (1975)).
B.
Because the standard for an award of punitive damages in
Utah is determinative of our holding, we review the history of
punitive damage s i n 1J t a 1 i. Pri or to 1979, punitive damages
could be imposed only after a finding of "actual malice M or
"malice in fact." See, e.g., Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354
(Utah 1975); Palombi v. D & C Builders , 22 Utah 2d 297, 452
P.2d 325 (Utah 19fi9> • Powers v. Tavlor, ] 1 I Jt< ih 2d 152

2. These jurisdictions include: Kansas (Gesslein v. B r i t t o n ,
175 K a n , 6 6 1 , 266 P.2d 263 (1954)) (gross and w a n t o n negligence
must b e a l l e g e d ) ; Ohio (Detling v, Chocklev, 70 Ohio S t . 2d 1 3 4 ,
436 N.E.2d 208 (Ohio 1982)) (Punitive da.rn.ages are n o t recoverable
based o n evidence of intoxication alone. Actual m a l i c e is
required w h i c h m e a n s defendant's actions must have been
intentional and d e l i b e r a t e or have the character of outrage
frequently associated with c r i m e . ) ; Oklahoma (Ruther v. T v r a , 207
Okla. 1 1 2 , 2,4.7 P. 2d 9 64 (1952)) (act must b e accompanied with.
evil intent or t h e result of such gross n e g l i g e n c e , such
disregard of another's rights, as is deemed the equivalent of
such in ten t) ; a. n d V i r g i n i a, (Baker v, Marcus , 2 01 V a . 9 0 5, 114
S.E.2d 617 (I960)) (court refused to award punitive damages
against the intoxicated driver holding that punitive damages are
allowed only where conduct is done with m a l i c e , r e c k l e s s n e s s , or
negligence that evinces a conscious disregard of t h e rights of
o t h e r s ) . A l t h o u g h Maryland has addressed the issue of punitive
damages i n the drunk driving context, the standard for an award
of punitive damages currently used by the Maryland courts in
drunk driving cases is ambiguous. See Giddings v. Zellan, 160
F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir, 1947) (applying Maryland law), cert, denied,
332 U.S. 759, 68 S.Ct. 61, 92 L.Ed. 345 (1947) (actual malice
required before punitive damages can be assessed against the
drunken driver); but see Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 36 A. 2 d
6 9 9 (19 4 4); Smith v, Gray Concrete Co, Ins., 267 Md 3 49 297
A.2d 721 (] 9 72) .
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379 P.2d 380 (1963); Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933
(1962); Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 989 (1960);
Evans v. Gainsford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952); Murphv v.
Booth, 36 Utah 285, 103 P. 768 (1909). In these cases, "actual
malice- or -malice in fact" was defined as willful and malicious
misconduct and described as an act done with evil intent and
with the purpose of injuring. See Kesler, 542 P.2d at 539; see
also McFarland v. Skaoos Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298, 303 n.ll
(Utah 1984).
In 1979, the Utah Supreme Court had an opportunity to
articulate the proper standard to be applied in assessing
punitive damages in false imprisonment cases. Terry v. Zions
COOP. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). The supreme
court held that in false imprisonment cases the defendant need
not manifest -actual malice- or -malice in fact.- Rather,
malice could be implied from conduct.
This presumed malice or malice in law
does not consist of personal hate or ill
will of one person towards another but
rather refers to that state of mind which
is reckless of law and of the legal
rights of the citizen in a person's
conduct toward that citizen. Therefore,
in false imprisonment cases the defendant
need not act with actual ill will or
hatred toward the person being confined.
In such cases malice in law will be
implied from unjustifiable conduct . . . .
Id. at 327. This -reckless disregard- standard was extended to
tort cases other than false imprisonment cases in Branch v.
Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 277 (Utah 1982)
(improper disposal of waste water). The supreme court, citing
Terry, held that punitive damages may be awarded when one acts
with reckless indifference and disregard of the law and his
fellow citizens. Id. The -actual malice- QT_ "reckless
disregard1* standard was reaffirmed in Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
HQSP., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983):

*': "

A defendant's conduct must be malicious ox
in reckless disregard for the rights of
others, although actual intent to cause
injury is not necessary.

Id, at 1186 (emphasis added).
In 1984 the supreme court reconsidered its position in
Terry and adopted a different standard for the imposition of
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punitive damages in false imprisonment cases:
[W]e adopt as the appropriate
standard for determining the
availability of a punitive damage
award in an action for false
imprisonment that of Hmalice in fact"
or -actual malice.w
McFarland, 678 P.2d at 304. However, the language and
reasoning of McFarland is limited to false imprisonment cases.
This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that the supreme
court has since cited the Hactual maliceM ox Hlegal malice*
standard with approval in cases — other than false imprisonment
cases — subsequent to McFarland: Synergetics v. Marathon
Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106, 1112-13 (Utah 1985)
("Punitive damages, among other things, punish conduct which
manifests a knowing or reckless indifference toward, and
disregard of, the rights of others."); Atkin, Wright & Miles v.
The Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 1985)
("Before punitive damages can be awarded, the plaintiff must
prove conduct that is willful and malicious or that manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference and disregard towards the
rights of others.").
In light of the aforementioned authority, we conclude
that the standard for an award of punitive damages in cases
other than false imprisonment cases in Utah is "actual
malice/malice in fact" ex "legal malice," i.e., conduct that
manifests a reckless disregard or indifference to the rights
and safety of others.
States with a standard for the imposition of punitive
damages similar to Utah have consistently permitted punitive
damages to be assessed against the drunken driver in the
appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Smith v. Chapman, 115
Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900, 903-04 (1977); Hawkinson v. Gever, 352
N.W.2d 784, 788 (Minn. App. 1984); Allers v. Willis, 197 Mont.
499, 643 P.2d 592, 596 (1982); Sveicara v. Whitman, 82 N.M.
739, 487 P.2d 167, 169 (N.M. App. 1971); Huff v. Chrismon, 68
N.C. App. 525, -315 S.E.2d 711, 715 (1984); Harrell v. Ames, 265
Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211, 215 (1973).
C.
The imposition of punitive damages against the drunken
driver under appropriate circumstances is harmonious with
Utah's public policy, evidenced by recent legislation. As
stated by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Huff v.
Chrismon, 68 N.C. App. 525, 315 S.E.2d 711 (1984):
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There appears to be a growing trend in
this State to maximize the punishment
and deterrence which impaired drivers
are subjected to. This trend is seen in
the recent enactment of the -Safe Roads
ActM with its stiff penalties for
impaired drivers. This State's growing
concern and outrage stemming from
injuries and deaths caused by impaired
drivers is further seen in our courts'
recognition of a common law dram shop
liability.

We believe that punitive damages, when
used in conjunction with the sanctions
of the -Safe Roads Act,- are consistent
with the trend to maximize punishment
and deterrence of impaired drivers and
would have a far reaching impact.
Id, at 715 (citations omitted).
Cognizant of the grave problems drunk driving poses, the
Utah Legislature has enacted one of the strongest impaired
driving laws in the country. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44 41-6-44.20 (1987). In addition, the 1981 Legislature passed
the -Dram Shop ActM which imposes liability for those who
provide intoxicating liquors which result in injuries to third
persons. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1 (1986). These statutes
represent a legislative determination that public safety is
gravely endangered when a person operates a motor vehicle after
consuming alcoholic beverages.
Assessing punitive damages against drunken drivers is
also consistent with the historical objectives of punitive
damages. The most commonly cited objectives for punitive
damages are: the punishment of the defendant, the deterrence of
the defendant from further offense, the deterrence of others
from similar conduct, and the vindication of society. See
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc. 675 P. 2d at 1186; see
also Peterson v. Super. Ct. of Ventura County, 31 Cal.3d 147,
642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982); Sebastian v. Wood,
246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954); Danculovich v. Brown, 593
P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979). The possibility of an award of punitive
damages may induce the victim, not otherwise willing to proceed
because of the trouble and expense, to take action against the
intoxicated driver. See Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc.2d 22, 349
N.Y.S.2d. 306, 308 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973). Since punitive
damages are usually paid by the defendant personally
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and not by insurance/3 the possible imposition of punitive
damages may well be a more effective deterrent than any
possible criminal penalty which may be imposed. See Colligan,
76 Misc.2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306, 310 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973).
Legal scholars and commentators also advocate the
imposition of punitive damages against drunken drivers. See,
Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 Pepperdine
L. Rev. 117 (1980); Note, Torts-Damages-The Drinking Driver and
Punitive Damages, 7 Wake Forest L. Rev. 528 (1971); Comment,
Damages-Intoxicated Driver-Punitive Damages, 46 Iowa L. Rev.
645 (1961); Comment, Punitive - Damages and their Possible
Application in Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 Va. L. Rev.
1036 (1960).
After careful examination of the authorities on this
question, we hold that punitive damages are recoverable against
a drunken driver in an automobile personal injury case where it
can be established (1) that the defendant motorist acted with
actual malice or a reckless disregard of the rights and safety
of others, and (2) that his drunken driving was a contributing
cause of the accident. We believe that one who drives a car
after voluntarily drinking to excess, with its great potential
for causing serious injury, could be found, under proper
circumstances, to demonstrate a -reckless indifference to the
rights of othersH sufficient to allow the issue of punitive
damages to be considered by the trier of fact. See Taylor v.
Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 24 Cal.2d 890, 598 P.2d 853,
157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979). We do not, however, hold that the
mere finding that a driver who was involved in an accident was
convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1987) would allow the
issue of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury.4
3. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co, v. McNulty,
307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
4.

[T]he violation of a statute is not sufficient
per se to allow an award, whether or not the
statute carries a criminal penalty, since the
violation of a statute by itself does not
necessarily indicate sufficient [actual malice
or reckless indifference towards the rights of
others]. However, violation of a statute may
be considered as evidence of [actual malice or
reckless indifference towards the rights and
safety of others].

Comment, Punitive Damages and their Possible
Application in Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 Va.
L. Rev. 1036, 1047 (1960). Furthermore, causation must
also be established.
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Our holding that punitive damages may be
assessed against the drunken driver under some
circumstances is supported by persuasive statistical
data linking drunken drivers with a high incidence of
traffic accidents and traffic fatalities. The 1983
Final Report of the Presidential Commission on Drunk
Driving states:
At least 50 percent of all highway deaths
involve the irresponsible use of alcohol.
Over the past ten years, 250,000 Americans
have tragically lost their lives in
alcohol-related crashes. Conservative
estimates place the annual economic loss at
$21 billion, while others run as high as $24
billion. There is, of course, no way to
measure the loss of human lives.
In single vehicle fatal crashes, for which
fault can be more easily ascertained than in
multiple vehicle crashes, upwards of 65
percent of those drivers who died were
legally under the influence, i.e., their
alcohol level was above 0.10. Furthermore,
more than half of the drunk drivers who were
involved in fatal crashes had blood alcohol
concentrations (BACs) twice that of the
legal limit. The average BAC of these drunk
drivers was 0.20.
/

This becomes even more significant in light
of the fact that only one in five hundred
(1/500) to one in two thousand (1/2000)
drivers on the road with a BAC greater than
0.10 are arrested for driving under the
influence. The low likelihood of arrest,
and a lenient judicial attitude fostered by
a misperception of the seriousness of the
offense, are important factors in
perpetuating the nation's drunk driving
problem.
1983 Final Report of the Presidential Commission on Drunk
Driving at 1.
Because the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that
punitive damages cannot be imposed against drunken drivers
absent a finding of actual malice, there was no occasion for
development of the factual record in the proceedings below.
The trial court did not focus on whether additional facts
regarding Duncan's conduct could be discovered and presented
which would have allowed a jury to conclude (1) that Duncan's
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conduct demonstrated a "reckless indifference to the rights and
safety of others," and (2) that her intoxication was a cause of
the accident. We, therefore, reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
D.
Because we remand for further proceedings, we attempt to
provide some guidance to the trial court.5 See Utah Farm
Production Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154, 158 (Utah
1987); see also R. Utah Ct. App. 30(a). Case law
overwhelmingly concludes that -whether punitive damages are
awarded is generally a question of fact within the sound
discretion and province of the jury. Smith v. Chapman, 115
Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900, 905 (1977); Mince v. Butters, 616 P.2d
127, 129 (Colo. 1980); Infeld v. Sullivan, 151 Conn. 506, 199
A.2d 693, 695 (1964); Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d
841, 845 (1954); Moore v. Bothe, 479 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1972); Powers v. Tavlor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380, 382
(1963); Wilson v. Oldrovd, 1 Utah 362, 267 P.2d 759, 766 (1954).
A jury should be instructed that punitive damages can be
imposed only after establishing that the drunken driving was a
cause of the injury and that the defendant motorist acted with
M
actual maliceM or "legal malice," i.e., a reckless
indifference to the rights and safety of others. In addition,
it must be remembered that M[t]he trier of fact is not required
to award punitive damages in a case in which they are
permissible, and it is error for a trial judge to instruct the
jury that punitive damages must be given." Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 908 comment d (1979); accord, C. McCormick,
Handbook on the Law of Damages, § 84 (1935).
Moreover, if reasonable minds could not differ in
concluding that Duncan's intoxication was not a cause of the
accident and subsequent injuries, or that Duncan's conduct did
not meet the standard of "legal malice," or a "reckless
indifference towards the right and safety of others," the court

5. We resist the temptation to provide further guidance by
suggesting specific kinds of behavior which, if present, should
point to or away from an award of punitive damages in an
accident caused by a driver who is intoxicated. We believe it
is best to move cautiously and permit application of the legal
standards set forth herein on a case-by-case basis.
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should eliminate the issue of punitive damages as a matter of
law,6 See Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982).
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Duncan claims that the imposition of punitive damages in
this civil suit against her, where a criminal penalty was
assessed for the same conduct, contravenes the prohibition
against double jeopardy, Utah Const, art. I, § 12. Duncan
contends that she will be punished twice for the same wrong.
An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have
addressed this issue have ruled that the imposition of punitive
damages does not contravene double jeopardy proscriptions.
See, e.g. , Security Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman
Associates, Inc., 108 N.J. Super. 137, 260 A.2d 248 (1970);
Sveicara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (1971); Roshak
v. Leathers, 277 Or. 207, 560.P.2d 275 (1977); g&& also Oleck,
Damages to Persons and Property (rev. ed. 1961), § 270;
Restatement (Second) Torts § 908 comment a (1979); Note, TortsDamages-The Drinking Driver and Punitive Damages, 7 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 528, 531 (1971).
Several Utah cases have awarded punitive damages in cases
where the same conduct could be punished criminally. E.g. ,
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Holdawav v. Hull,
505 P.2d 295 (Utah 1973); Evans v. Garsfad, 247 P.2d 431 (Utah
1952).
Other jurisdictions in drunken driving cases have
specifically rejected the double jeopardy argument. Peterson
v. Super. Ct of Ventura County, 31 Cal.3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305,
181 Cal Rptr. 784 (1982); Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210
S.W.2d 293 (1948); Sveicara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d

6. Relying principally on an exchange between the court and
Duncan's counsel during argument for modification of the
court's order dismissing the punitive damages claim, Biswell
suggests the court would have ruled the same way even if it
viewed the case from the perspective of the "reckless
disregard" standard. Since the trial court's focus was so
clearly on which standard applied, we are not persuaded by this
argument. Moreover, the factual record was not sufficiently
developed to have permitted an informed decision that Duncan
did not act in "reckless disregard" as a matter of law.

860124-CA

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

167 (1971); Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562
(1945).7 We agree with the majority.
We are persuaded that the constitutional immunity from
double jeopardy is limited to criminal proceedings. Comment,.
Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 Pepperdine L. Rev.
117, 130 (1980). A punitive damage award is civil in nature.
Thus, although the award of punitive damages is a type of
penalty imposed to deter wrongful conduct, M[t]he authorization
to award exemplary damages . . . does not convert a civil
action into a criminal action insofar as it affects
constitutional protections in criminal proceedings.- Peterson
v. Super. Ct. of Ventura County, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 162, 642 P.2d
1305, 1313, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 792 (1982) (quoting People v.
Super. Ct.. 12 Cal.3d 421, 433, 525 P.2d 716, 115 Cal. Rptr.
812 (1974).
We find that the imposition of punitive damages against a
drunken driver in a civil action, who may also be punished
criminally for the same conduct, does not violate the double
jeopardy prohibition in Utah's Constitution.
-LIGHTING UP" PRE-EXISTING CONDITION
On appeal,- Biswell further contends that the trial court
committed reversible error by incorrectly instructing the jury
on the extent of Duncan's liability for aggravating or
M
lighting upM Biswell1s pre-existing asymptomatic back
condition.
Failure to give requested jury instructions constitutes
reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead the
jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law. In
re Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 96-97 (Utah 1985). A party
is entitled to have his theory submitted to the jury but it is
not error when requested instructions are fully covered in the
other instructions given. Watters v. Ouerry, 626 P.2d 455,
458-59 (Utah 1981). Instructions should be read in their
entire context and given meaning in accordance with the
ordinary and usual import of the language as it would be
understood by lay jurors. Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364,
412 P.2d 451, 452-53 (1966).
Although Biswell suffered from degenerative changes in
her spine prior to the accident, at trial she claimed that her
prior conditions and ailments had been resolved and that she
suffered no symptoms before the accident. Biswell alleged that
7. Only a small minority, including Indiana and Nebraska,
prohibit punitive damages where a tort is also a crime. Roshak
v. Leathers, 277 Or. 207, 560 P.2d 275, 277-78 (1977).
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it was only after the accident that she experienced the pain
she currently endures in her lower back. This was her theory
of the case and she had a right to have it fairly presented to
the jury.
The rule is well settled that when a defendant's
negligence aggravates or lights up a latent, dormant,- or
asymptomatic condition, or one to which the injured person is
predisposed, the defendant is liable to the injured person for
the full amount of damages which ensue, notwithstanding such
diseased or weakened condition. In other words, when a latent
condition itself does not cause pain, but that condition plus
an injury brings on pain by aggravating the pre-existing
condition, then the injury, not the dormant condition, is the
proximate cause of the pain and disability. A plaintiff,
therefore, is entitled to recover all damages which actually
and necessarily follow the injury. See Owen v. Dix, 30 Ark.
189, 196 S.W.2d 913, 915 (1946); C, F. Hamblen, Inc. v. Owens,
172 So. 694, 696 (Fla. 1937); Jones v. Citv of Caldwell, 20
Idaho 5, 116 P. 110, 113 (1911); Becker v. D & E Distributing
Co., 247 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Iowa 1976); Holt v. McCann, 58 Tenn.
App. 248, 429 S.W.2d 441, 445 (1966); Brunson v. Strong, 17
Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451, 453 (1966); Bennett v. Messick, 76
Wash. 2d 474, 457 P.2d 609, 612 (1969).
Having ascertained the extent of a tortfeasor's liability
for aggravating a dormant condition, we must determine whether
the trial court properly instructed the jury on this issue.
Instruction No. 17 given by the trial court states:
You are instructed that the damages that may
be assessed in this case should not be reduced
simply because the plaintiff may suffer from a
pre-existing or abnormal condition. If you
find that the plaintiff suffers from an
abnormal or pre-existing condition which has
not been proximately caused by the accident,
even though it may invite your sympathy, you
may not assess any damage against the
defendant for that condition. However, if the
accident has been the proximate cause of
aggravating such pre-existing condition, that
should be considered bv vou in determining
general damages. (Emphasis added.)
We are persuaded that the instruction given by the trial
court was not a clear statement of the law under Biswell's
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theory of the case.8 On remand the court should give an
instruction which clearly expresses the concept that if
Duncan's negligence aggravated or lit up Biswell*s dormant
asymptomatic condition, then Biswell is entitled to recover all
the damages which follow.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

8. The instruction proffered by Biswell containing her theory
of the case states:
Plaintiff, Royce Biswell, may not recover
damages for any pre-existing condition or
disability she may have had which did not result
from any fault of the defendant, but she is
entitled to recover damages for any injury she
suffered, including any aggravation or lighting
up of such a pre-existing condition or
disability, which was proximately caused by
defendant's negligence.
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